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1The Decisions and Ideal Points of British Law Lords
2CHRIS HANRETTY*
3Policy-sensitive models of judicial behaviour, whether attitudinal or strategic, have largely passed
4Britain by. This article argues that this neglect has been benign, because explanations of judicial
5decisions in terms of the positions of individual judges fare poorly in the British case. To support this
6argument, the non-unanimous opinions of British Law Lords between 1969 and 2009 are analysed.
7A hierarchical item-response model of individual judges’ votes is estimated in order to identify judges’
8locations along a one-dimensional policy space. Such a model is found to be no better than a null
9model that predicts that every judge will vote with the majority with the same probability. Locations
10generated by the model do not represent judges’ political attitudes, only their propensity to dissent.
11Consequently, judges’ individual votes should not be used to describe them in political terms.
12In November 2001, Home Secretary David Blunkett implied that judges who objected to
13plans to indeﬁnitely detain foreign nationals suspected of terrorism lived in an ‘airy fairy
14libertarian’ world.1 Those measures had been struck down by the Appellate Committee of
15the House of Lords (the ‘Law Lords’) by a majority of eight to one.2 One interpretation of
16that decision is that it split eight airy-fairy libertarians from one hard-nosed realist – that
17is, it separated judges located in a dimension running from libertarianism to conservatism.
18Analysing non-unanimous decisions in order to estimate the locations of judges in the
19political space is commonplace in political science. Scholars have shown that US Supreme
20Court Justice Ginsburg is more liberal than Justice Scalia,3 that Australian High Court
21Justice Kirby is to the left of Justice Callinan4 and that Canadian Supreme Court Justice
22L’Heureux-Dube´ is to the left of Justice Sopinski.5 Despite David Robertson’s work on
23judicial discretion in the Lords,6 it is not clear whether we have comparable grounds
24for believing, say, that Lord Scarman is to the left of Baron Ackner.
25This article argues that we cannot locate Law Lords in the political space on the basis of
26their individual votes. Whilst we can recover ideal points for judges, an ideal point model
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27 is a very poor model of judges’ decision making, and should be rejected. Even if the model
28 were accepted, the ideal points do not represent positions in the political space, but rather
29 judges’ attitudes towards dissent. Consequently, it is mistaken to call judges ‘airy fairy
30 libertarians’, ministerial comments notwithstanding.
31 WHY MIGHT JUDGES JUDGE POLITICALLY?
32 There is an extensive literature on the politics of the judiciary. We know that, deﬁnitionally,
33 courts are political institutions,7 that they have important consequences for the rest of the
34 political system8 and that judges can play important non-judicial roles in public life.9 My focus
35 is narrower. When I describe judges as being political, or talk of judges judging politically,
36 I mean that they make decisions on the basis of ‘political’ beliefs: speciﬁcally, that when judges
37 decide how to dispose of a case – typically whether to allow or dismiss an appeal – their
38 decisions are a function of the location of that case and that judge in some political space, such
39 that judges who are far apart in that political space will be less likely to agree on the
40 disposition of a case. This deﬁnition encompasses both ‘attitudinal’10 and ‘strategic’11
41 accounts of political judging, but excludes analyses that try to explain the decisions of panels
42 of judges or infer judges’ positions from the decisions of panels they have sat on.12
43 There are both general and particular reasons for believing that judges are political in
44 this sense. Generally, judges in comparable courts have been shown to be political. Of the
45 seven common law courts of last resort in large, consolidated democracies, analysis of
46 judges’ ideal points has been undertaken in four courts: the US and Canadian Supreme
47 Courts, the Australian High Court, and, for a limited period, the Appellate Committee
48 itself.13 Scholars who have analysed these courts have always provided estimates of
49 judges’ political positions – even if, in certain cases, the solutions provided were ‘not
50 technically very good’.14 Consequently, if the Law Lords do not judge politically, they
51 would be an exception to a general pattern amongst similarly located bodies.
7 Richard Hodder-Williams, ‘Six Notions of Political and the United States Supreme Court’, British
Journal of Political Science, 22 (1992), 1–20.
8 Mary L. Volcansek, ‘Constitutional Courts as Veto Players: Divorce and Decrees in Italy’, European
Journal of Political Research, 39 (2001), 347–72.
9 Gavin Drewry, ‘Judges and Political Inquiries: Harnessing a Myth’, Political Studies, 23 (1975),
49–61.
10 Jeffrey A. Segal and Harold J. Spaeth, The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1993).
11 See Cornell W. Clayton and Howard Gillman, Supreme Court Decision-Making: New Institutionalist
Approaches (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999); Thomas H. Hammond, Chris W. Bonneau and
Reginald S. Sheehan, Strategic Behavior and Policy Choice on the US Supreme Court (Stanford University
Press, 2005); and Cass R. Sunstein, David Schkade, Lisa Ellman and Andres Sawicki, Are Judges
Political?: An Empirical Analysis of the Federal Judiciary (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press,
2006).
12 This second strategy is employed by Robertson, Judicial Discretion in the House of Lords.
13 For the US: Martin and Quinn, ‘Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via Markov Chain Monte Carlo
for the US Supreme Court, 1953–1999’; for Canada: Alarie and Green, ‘The Reasonable Justice: An
Empirical Analysis of Justice Frank Iacobuccis Career on the Supreme Court of Canada’; for Australia:
Wood, ‘Dimensions of Decision Making: Determining the Complexity of Politics on the High Court of
Australia’; and Tony Blackshield, ‘X/Y/Z/N Scales: The High Court of Australia, 1972–1976’, in Roman
Tomasic, ed., Understanding Lawyers: Perspectives on the Legal Profession in Australia (Sydney: Law
Foundation of New South Wales, 1978).
14 Robertson, ‘Judicial Ideology in the House of Lords’, p. 10.
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52The particular reason for believing that we can locate judges in the political space is that
53British politicians and commentators have often described judges as holding certain
54political values, and implied or stated that these values inﬂuence their decisions. Judges
55have been variously – and contradictorily – described as pursuing ‘the protection of
56property rights, andy political views normally associated with the Conservative party’15;
57having ‘the ideology of old-middle class meny [and] the ethos of those who run an
58administrative state’16, and as being ‘airy fairy libertarians’. Often, these values have been
59ascribed to the judiciary as a whole. This characterization might mean that judges who
60share the same values always reach the same decision, and that analysing dissenting
61opinions is useless. However, this view has always been rather difﬁcult to square with the
62brute fact of dissent. As Lee asks:17
63How can it be so simple when there is a 3-2 split in the House of Lords, overturning a 0-3
64decision in the Court of Appeal, which was itself overturning the High Court?
65Consequently, the attribution to judges en masse of certain political values gives us
66reason to believe that individual judges judge politically in the sense described above.
67Existing quantitative studies of Appellate Committee decision making also suggest
68that judges judge politically. Early work by David Robertson18 used multidimensional
69scaling (MDS) to analyse non-unanimous Appellate Committee decisions between 1965
70and 1978. He found that three dimensions characterized judicial behaviour. The ﬁrst
71dimension concerned criminal law, with high scores associated with ﬁnding for the
72prosecution. The second dimension concerned public law, with high scores associated
73with ﬁnding for the state. The third dimension was left uninterpreted. Even with three
74dimensions, the ﬁt of the MDS solution was poor, with high stress values.
75Later work by Robertson abandoned MDS, and with it the analysis of (dis)agreement
76between judges. Judicial Discretion in the House of Lords exploited the fact that cases are
77heard by panels of the Appellate Committee, and that consequently judges may hear some
78cases but not others. Robertson conducted multiple discriminant analysis on cases heard
79between 1986 and 1995, asking, for a number of particular outcomes of interest – ﬁndings
80for the Revenue in tax cases, for the state in public law cases, for plaintiffs in
81constitutional law and civil liberties cases, and for the defendant in criminal cases –
82whether the (assumed random) presence of judge X on the panel made such an outcome
83more or less likely. In order to combine insights from different types of cases, factor
84analysis was performed on judges’ scores on the linear discriminant analysis.
85Although a number of factor analytic solutions were possible, Robertson’s preferred
86solution involved dropping criminal cases and presenting two dimensions: egalitarianism
87(associated with ﬁnding for the state in public law and for the plaintiff in civil liberties
88cases) and constitutionalism (ﬁnding for the plaintiff in constitutional cases). Because this
89method of analysis can use unanimous decisions, Robertson was able to make inferences
90on the basis of far more cases than would have been possible including only cases with
91dissent – though at the cost of specifying, ex ante, the components of judicial ideology.
92At the same time, there are considerable grounds for doubting that British judges judge
93politically. The ﬁrst is that levels of dissent are limited in comparative perspective, and
15 J.A.G. Grifﬁth, The Politics of the Judiciary, 3rd edn. (London: Fontana, 1985), p. 199.
16 Robertson, Judicial Discretion in the House of Lords, p. 401, fn. 1.
17 Simon Lee, Judging Judges (London: Faber and Faber, 1988), pp. 4–5.
18 Robertson, ‘Judicial Ideology in the House of Lords’.
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94 whilst unanimity may point to the homogeneity of judicial preferences or the absence of
95 Dworkinesque ‘tough cases’, it may also indicate that judges do not decide on the basis
96 of their political positions, but rather on the basis of shared views of what the law
97 requires. That is, agreement may indicate that judges are not political. Figure 1 shows that
98 agreement in the House of Lords is higher than agreement in all those common law courts
99 of last resort in which analysis of dissenting opinions has been successfully applied.19 Only
100 judges on the Indian Supreme Court agree more, and they face a much higher caseload.
101 Second, the British constitution offers few opportunities for policy-seeking judges.
102 Attitudinal models of judicial decision making, in which judges’ political attitudes are the
103 exclusive determinants of judicial behaviour, have been assumed to apply best where
104 courts are at the top of their respective judicial hierarchy, and are not subject to overrule.
105 Yet for most of the period discussed here, British courts have been at risk of legislative
106 overrule by simple majorities. Whilst strategic decision making – that is, decision making
107 in anticipation of legislative overrule – has not been thought severe enough to entirely
108 preclude the estimation of judges’ political locations, the constraint implied by legislative
109 overrule by simple majority is so extensive, and the policy ‘core’ so reduced, that a
110 strategic desire to avoid overrule may cause British judges to become political mutes,
111 reducing them to redundant veto points. Consequently, ‘political’ judges in the British
112 system would have to act with casual disregard for the possibility of overrule – and, one
113 might reason, be unlikely to reach the higher rungs of the judiciary in the ﬁrst place.
114 DATA AND MODEL
115 I use data from the High Courts Judicial Database,20 which includes data on all decisions
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Fig. 1. Agreement rates across ﬁve courts
19 The measure is from Philip L. Dubois and Paul F. Dubois, ‘Measuring Dissent Behavior on State
Courts: An Application and an Adaptation of Known Measurement Techniques’, Polity, 13 (1980),
147–58. The data is from the High Courts Judicial Database (fn 20), http://sitemason.vanderbilt.edu/site/
d5YnT2/data_sets.)
20 Stacie L. Haynie, Reginald S. Sheehan, Donald R. Songer and C. Neal Tate, ‘High Courts Judicial
Database: Version 1.1’, 2007, downloaded December 2009.
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117of Lords (or by the Privy Council acting in its judicial capacity) and reported in the
118All England Law Reports. I have supplemented this data with my own data on all
119non-unanimous cases decided by the Appellate Committee between 2004 and 2009.
120I consider only non-unanimous cases – those in which there was at least one dissenting
121opinion – in this article.21 By a dissenting opinion, I mean an opinion that disagreed
122with the majority of the court over how to dispose of the case: typically, though not
123exclusively, whether to allow or to dismiss the appeal. I do not, therefore, consider
124opinions that disagree with the majority of the court over the ratio decidendi of the case.22
125The data matrix is therefore made up of 1,592 individual decisions taken by ﬁfty-nine
126judges in 318 cases. Decisions by a small number of judges who heard very few cases23
127were excluded. My data also contain information on the outcome of each case. These
128outcomes have, in certain areas of the law, been coded as ‘liberal’ or ‘conservative’,
129following established usage.24 Table 1 shows this information, and the number of cases in
130seven broad areas of the law. Information about case outcomes is used in the model that
131I now describe.
132To explain judicial decisions I use a hierarchical item response model estimated using
133Bayesian methods. Item response models have become increasingly popular in political
134science, and can be considered to directly operationalize the attitudinal model of judicial
135decision making. They improve on previous methods of analysing judicial behaviour,
136in particular multidimensional scaling of agreement between judges, by relaxing the
137assumption that every instance of (dis)agreement between judges is related to the latent
138trait under investigation. Bayesian methods – in particular the Markov Chain Monte
139Carlo (MCMC) method – allow otherwise intractable or computationally expensive
140models to be estimated.25
141The response I wish to model is the ‘vote’ y of each judge j in a given case i. By
142convention, yij5 1 if the judge voted with the majority, and yij5 0 if the judge dissented.
143The probability of voting with the majority can be modelled as a function of three
144variables: the judge’s location and the location and discrimination of the case. The judge’s
145location (yj) is his/her location in an n-dimensional political space. In this note, the policy
146space is one-dimensional, and the presumption is that the dimension will run from left to
147right, or from liberal to conservative.
148The case discrimination parameter (bi) represents the degree to which the case
149discriminates with respect to the recovered dimension: cases with higher absolute values
150of bi are very good at separating judges along the recovered dimension. This parameter
21 In the model of judicial decision making that I use, unanimous decisions provide no information
about the relative or absolute positions of the judges. While it is true that panels of judges may
unanimously give decisions that seem to be particularly left wing or right wing, it does not necessarily
follow that the judges who decided those cases were particularly left wing or right wing. Non-unanimous
cases, by contrast, allow us to identify differences between justices that may reﬂect attitudes towards
public policy.
22 Disagreements over rationes may be informative about judges’ politics, but are not relevant to the
analysis I present here.
23 Lords Emslie, Irvine of Lairg, Taylor of Gosforth, Havers, Wheatley, Avonside and Parker of
Waddington.
24 This (North American-inﬂuenced) coding of cases may seem strange to British lawyers, who might
expect left-leaning judges to ﬁnd against the state in public law, particularly in immigration and
deportation disputes.
25 Simon Jackman, ‘Bayesian Analysis for Political Research’, Annual Review of Political Science, 7
(2004), 483–505.
The Decisions and Ideal Points of British Law Lords 5
TABLE 1 Areas of the Law and OutcomesQ1





1. Civil liberties [29] Equal treatment & discrimination; civil
rights claims by prisoners; rights of speech,
press, assembly, etc.
Victory for those alleging
infringement of their
civil liberties
7 (24.1%) 13 (44.8%)
2. Commercial law [67] Landlord-tenant disputes, contract disputes,
creditor-debtor disputes, insurance
disputes, etc.
Victory for the economic underdog 10 (14.9%) 14 (20.9%)
3. Criminal law [54] Murder, serious property crime, crimes against
morality, etc.
Victory for the defendant 19 (35.2%) 27 (50%)
4. Family law [10] Marriage and divorce disputes, inheritance
and succession disputes
Not applicable N/A N/A
5. Other cases [3] Regulation of bar & judiciary Not applicable N/A N/A
6. Public law [102] Taxation; beneﬁts; immigration, deportation,
& citizenship; public employment, etc.
Victory for the state 44 (43.1%) 38 (37.3%)
7. Tort [53] Injured workers, medical or legal malpractice,
libel, other tort
Victory for the injured party 24 (45%) 21 (39.6%)










151also tells us which end of the policy space is more likely to vote with the majority. If the
152space is indeed a left-right policy space, a case with a positive discrimination parameter
153requires ‘more’ of the latent trait (positions further along the real number line to the right)
154to vote with the majority – and therefore has a right-leaning outcome. Conversely, a case
155with a negative discrimination parameter implies a left-leaning outcome. The case
156location parameter (ai) represents how much of the latent trait is needed to vote with the
157majority – that is, how far along the recovered dimension the case discriminates.
158I link these variables to each judge’s vote as follows:26
PrðYij ¼ 1Þ ¼ fðbiyjaiÞ; ð1Þ
15960where f(  ) is the cumulative normal distribution.
161I innovate in my treatment of the case discrimination parameter. There are three broad
162approaches to dealing with discrimination parameters.27 One approach is to set the value
163of the discrimination parameter to one for all cases. This is the simplest operationalization
164of the spatial voting model. Models with ﬁxed discrimination parameters are common
165in the educational testing literature, where they are referred to as Rasch models.28
166Constraining the discrimination parameter in this way makes sense in educational testing,
167since investigators may reasonably presume that standardized test items tap an underlying
168dimension to the same degree and in a similar way. The same is not true of legislative roll
169calls or court cases, which may discriminate with respect to the recovered dimension to
170various degrees, with some strongly discriminating, others weakly discriminating and
171others not discriminating at all.
172A second approach is to sample the discrimination parameters from an uninformative
173prior distribution. Where investigators have reason to believe that items differ in
174discriminating between positions on the recovered dimension, and where no auxiliary
175information concerning the contents of the items is available, this is the best approach.
176The downside of this approach is that it does not employ auxiliary information
177concerning the substantive content of the items, therefore model parameters may be
178highly uncertain.
179A third approach is to sample some or all of the discrimination parameters from an
180informative prior distribution. In most instances, this method has involved constraining
181some discrimination parameters to take on theoretically informed values. Bafumi et al.
182consider, but ultimately reject, constraining the discrimination parameters for a model of
183US Supreme Court voting in which ‘1’ indicates ‘liberal’ outcomes: such an approach
184‘relies too strongly on the precoding, which, even if it is generally reasonable, is not
185perfect’.29 Jackman sets two roll calls that are mirror images of each other to discriminate,
186with equal and opposite strength, with respect to the second recovered dimension in a
187multidimensional item response model.30
26 Joshua Clinton, Simon Jackman and Douglas Rivers, ‘The Statistical Analysis of Roll Call Data’,
American Political Science Review, 98 (2004), 355–70.
27 Online supplementary information shows that my ﬁndings are not sensitive to the choice of approach
to modelling the discrimination parameter.
28 Georg Rasch, Probabilistic Models for Some Intelligence and Attainment Tests (Copenhagen: Danish
Institute for Educational Research, 1960).
29 Joseph Bafumi, Andrew Gelman, David K. Park and Noah Kaplan, ‘Practical Issues in
Implementing and Understanding Bayesian Ideal Point Estimation’, Political Analysis, 13 (2005), p. 171.
30 Simon Jackman, ‘Multidimensional Analysis of Roll Call Data via Bayesian Simulation:
Identiﬁcation, Estimation, Inference, and Model Checking’, Political Analysis, 9 (2001), p. 227.
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188 Both of these strategies use auxiliary information to estimate item response models with
189 genuinely informative parameter estimates. They rely, however, on the choice of the
190 discrimination parameters to constrain.
191 A more forgiving strategy is to model the discrimination parameters as a function of other
192 variables. Here, I model the discrimination parameters as a function of the broad area of law
193 and of the direction of the outcome, considered either as a ‘liberal’ or ‘conservative’
194 outcome. The discrimination parameters are drawn from normal distributions, the means of
195 which are modelled as a linear function of these area-speciﬁc intercepts and the direction of
196 the case outcome. Thus, if xi51 denotes a ‘liberal’ outcome in case i, and k indexes the seven
197 areas of law shown in Table 1, the discrimination parameters can be modelled as follows:
bi  Nððg0k þ g1kxiÞ; sÞ; ð2Þ
1989 where g0k and g1k are area-speciﬁc intercepts and coefﬁcients, respectively.
31 Cases without
200 directionality are drawn from an uninformative prior distribution.
201 This strategy allows us to plausibly exploit information about the area and the
202 outcome. Suppose, as Robertson claimed, that tax cases discriminate between judges very
203 well, with some judges favouring the Inland Revenue and others favouring taxpayers.
204 In that case, the area-speciﬁc intercept will be close to zero and the parameter attached to
205 the case outcome will not only be very large, but if the recovered dimension runs from
206 ‘left’ to ‘right’, will also be strongly negative. If, by contrast, family law cases do not on
207 average discriminate with respect to the recovered dimension, the parameter attached to
208 the case outcome will not be different from zero.
209 I estimated this model using the JAGS MCMC sampler. The model was identiﬁed by
210 post-processing the MCMC output so that (1) ideal points had mean zero and unit
211 standard deviation and (2) Bridge of Harwich was to the right of Grifﬁths.32 The code
212 used is shown in the online appendix. The model was run for two million iterations,
213 discarding the ﬁrst 750,000 iterations as burn-in and thinning the remaining samples by a
214 factor of 250. A standard convergence diagnostic (Geweke’s diagnostic) and inspection of
215 the trace plots showed no problems with convergence.33
216 RESULTS
217 Whilst the model does produce estimates of judges’ locations, which show differences between
218 judges (see Figure 2), this article argues that the model that produces these estimates should
219 not be accepted – and that these estimates do not, in any case, represent a substantive
220 dimension of politics. I base this argument on three points: ﬁrst, the ﬁt of the model is
221 extremely poor, and does not represent an improvement over a null model; secondly, the
222 parameters relating to case discrimination do not make sense; and thirdly, whilst the locations
223 might seem at ﬁrst glance to indicate strong partisan differences between judges, these
224 locations do not reﬂect judges’ political attitudes, but rather their attitudes to dissent.
31 This model in no way constrains cases of a certain directionality to discriminate with respect to the
recovered dimension: the credible intervals surrounding the coefﬁcients g1k are extremely large and
encompass zero.
32 Bridge and Grifﬁths were chosen because they lay at opposite ends of Robertson’s 1998
‘constitutionalism’ dimension, with Bridge more likely to ﬁnd in favour of appellants alleging
infringement of their civil rights.
33 Values of Geweke’s diagnostic were within the range 61.96 for all but two judges. Trace plots are
available on request.
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225First, I discuss model ﬁt. I take as my comparison a null model in which every judge
226votes with the majority with p5 0.695, equal to the percentage of concurring opinions in
227the dataset. Table 2 presents a number of indicators of ﬁt for both the null model and the
228item response model.
229It is clear from the table that the item response model scarcely improves on the null model.
230Considering the four different measures of model ﬁt – the percentage of decisions predicted




































































Fig. 2. Judge locations
34 The percentage reduction in error (PRE) for each vote is the number of votes in the minority, minus
the number of incorrect predictions, divided by the number of votes in the minority. A perfectly predicted
vote has an PRE of 1. The APRE is simply the PRE averaged over all votes.
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232 geometric mean probability (GMP)35 – the item response model outperforms the null model
233 only by very small amounts. This extremely limited improvement, when coupled with the
234 considerable cost in terms of the number of model parameters compared to the null model,
235 ought to discourage us from adopting the model.
236 Secondly, the discrimination parameters, and the coefﬁcients that predict them, do not
237 make sense if the recovered dimension is to run from left to right. We should expect cases
238 with a liberal outcome to have negative discrimination parameters, and cases with a
239 conservative outcome to have positive ones. Yet all ‘liberal’ cases had a positive
240 discrimination parameter – as did all ‘conservative’ cases. Only a handful of cases (ﬁfteen)
241 had a negative discrimination parameter, and they were all cases that lacked a clear direction.
242 Whether our recovered dimension runs from left to right or right to left, this ﬁnding implies
243 that one side of the court was permanently in the majority, whilst the other side was
244 permanently condemned to fruitless dissent. Such an interpretation is difﬁcult to sustain,
245 given the rough parity between ‘liberal’ and ‘conservative’ outcomes shown in Table 1.
246 The coefﬁcients predicting these discrimination parameters also performed poorly.
247 Although four out of ﬁve coefﬁcients had the right sign, the coefﬁcient was signiﬁcantly
248 different from zero at the 95 per cent level in only one case (public law). In one issue
249 area – criminal law – the coefﬁcient had the wrong sign, though again it was not readily
250 distinguishable from zero.36
251 Thirdly, the judges’ positions, whilst superﬁcially related to their politics, are not related to
252 their positions in judging, but rather to their propensity to dissent. From Figure 2 it might
253 seem that there is a powerful partisan division between the judges, with justices such as
254 Lords Bingham and Scarman to the left of the median justice (Lord Hutton), and justices like
255 Lords Ackner and Roskill to the right. There is a large cluster of Conservative appointees at
256 the right end of the scale, and we can be conﬁdent that the median Labour appointee lies to
257 the left of the median Conservative appointee (P½~yLabo ~yCons ¼ 0:82).37
258 This interpretation is strengthened by considering the known politics of these judges.
259 Suppose we describe a judge as ‘conservative’ if he has contested a seat for the
TABLE 2 Model Fit Statistics
Item response model Null model
Decisions predicted correctly 71.7% 69.5%
Best, by judge Brightman (100%) Donovan, Lane, Phillips (100%)




Discriminating cases 68.5% N/A
Note: ‘Discriminating cases’ are those cases that had a discrimination parameter whose 95 per cent
credible interval did not encompass zero.
35 The GMP is the exponential of the average log-likelihood.
36 These coefﬁcients are not reported here, but are available on request.
37 Note that, though Viscount Dilhorne was appointed a Lord of Appeal in Ordinary by the Wilson
government, he is considered a Conservative appointee, as he previously served as Lord Chancellor under
Macmillan and Douglas-Home.
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260Conservative party, held a government post under a Conservative administration or been
261described by reliable commentators as a ‘conservative’ judge. Of the fourteen judges who
262qualify as ‘conservative’ based on these criteria (Ackner, Brightman, Diplock, Hobhouse,
263Millett and Roskill as conservative judges,38 and Clyde, Dilhorne, Fraser, Guest,
264Hailsham, Reid, Simon and Wilberforce as former Conservative or Unionist ofﬁce
265holders or candidates39, nine lie to the right of the median justice, Rodger of Earlsferry.
266Of the ﬁve remaining judges, one (Wilberforce) was an unsuccessful Conservative
267candidate before starting on the bench, two (Dilhorne and Simon of Glaisdale) were legal
268ofﬁcers in Conservative governments and two (Lords Hobhouse and Millet) were perhaps
269only described as conservative in contrast to expectations about the Blair government’s
270likely judicial appointments.
271Conversely, suppose we describe as ‘progressive’ all those judges who have contested a
272seat for the Labour party or the Liberal party prior to World War II, held government
273posts under a Labour administration or been described by reliable commentators as
274‘progressive’ or ‘liberal’. Of the ﬁve judges who can be described as progressive (Donovan,
275Salmon, Elwyn-Jones, Scarman and Morris of Borth-y-Gest),40 all but one – Lord
276Donovan – lie to the left of the median justice.
38 Ackner: ‘unashamedly conservative’ (Michael Beloff, ‘Ackner, Desmond James Conrad, Baron
Ackner (1920–2006), Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, 2010); Brightman: ‘[s]een as conservative
and relatively pro-Executive’ (obituary, Daily Telegraph, 8 February 2006); Diplock: ‘a hard man’ in
capital cases (Stephen Sedley and Godfray Le Quesne, ‘Diplock (William John) Kenneth, Baron Diplock
(1907–1985)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, 2010); Hobhouse, Millett: ‘strongly conservative’
(Kate Malleson, ‘Appointments to the House of Lords: Who Goes Upstairs’, in Lewis Blom-Cooper,
Brice Dickson and Gavin Drewry, eds, The Judicial House of Lords 1876–2009 (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2009), p. 119); Roskill: Templeman describes Roskill as being ‘savedy from pomposity
and ultra-conservatism’ by his sympathy for his fellow man, suggesting at least some degree of
conservatism (Sydney Templeman, ‘Roskill, Eustace Wentworth, Baron Roskill (1911–1996)’, Oxford
Dictionary of National Biography, 2010).
39 Clyde: stood for Parliament as a Conservative candidate in 1974 (obituary, Daily Telegraph, 14
March 2009); Dilhorne: as Reginald Manningham-Buller, served as Attorney-General under Churchill,
Eden and Macmillan; Fraser: stood for Parliament as a Unionist candidate in 1955 (George Emslie,
‘Fraser, (Walter) Ian Reid, Baron Fraser of Tullybelton (1911–1989)’, Oxford Dictionary of National
Biography, 2010); Guest: stood for Parliament as a Unionist candidate in 1945 (Jauncey of Tullichettle,
‘Guest, Christopher William Graham, Baron Guest (1901–1984)’, Oxford Dictionary of National
Biography, 2010). Hailsham: served as Lord Chancellor under Thatcher; Mackay of Clashfern: served as
Lord Chancellor under Thatcher and Major; Reid: elected to Parliament as a Conservative member for
Stirling and Falkirk (Thomas Broun Smith, ‘Reid, James Scott Cumberland, Baron Reid (1890–1975)’,
Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, 2010). Simon: elected to Parliament as Conservative member
for Middlesborough West (Stephen Cretney, ‘Simon, Jocelyn Edward Salis, Baron Simon of Glaisdale
(1911–2006)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, 2010). Wilberforce: stood for Parliament as
Conservative candidate for Central Hull (Patrick Neill, ‘Wilberforce, Richard Orme, Baron Wilberforce
(1907–2003)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, 2010).
40 Donovan: elected to Parliament as Labour member for East Leicester, subsequently North East
Leicester (Bob Hepple, ‘Donovan, Terence Norbert, Baron Donovan (1898–1971)’, Oxford Dictionary of
National Biography, 2010); Salmon: known for his ‘sometimes outspoken and fearless defence of liberal
values and of the rights of the individual against intrusion by the state or by fellow citizens who failed to
respect what became known as his, or her, human rights’ (Anthony Evans, ‘Salmon, Cyril Barnet, Baron
Salmon (1903–1991)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, 2010). Elwyn-Jones: served as Attorney-
General under Wilson, and as Lord Chancellor under Wilson and Callaghan; Scarman: viewed by the
‘hard core’ of the Bar as a ‘bleeding heart’ (obituary, Guardian, 10 December 2004); Morris of Borth-y-
Gest: stood for Parliament as Liberal candidate for Ilford (Herbert Edmund-Davies, ‘Morris, John
William, Baron Morris of Borth-y-Gest (1896–1979)’, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, 2010).
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277 However, this interpretation of the recovered dimension as a conservative-liberal
278 dimension is not borne out by more basic statistics on case outcomes. For each issue area,
279 we can calculate a judge’s raw ‘liberalism score’ – the percentage of times s/he voted in
280 a notionally liberal direction, as described in Table 1. Although the correlation between a
281 judge’s location and his/her raw liberalism score is negative, as expected, the correlation is
282 very weak (r520.29) (see Figure 3a).
283 Only one judge characteristic is reliably associated with their location. The correlation
284 between judges’ rate of dissent and his/her location is highly signiﬁcant (p, 0.001) and
285 strong (r520.83) (see Figure 3b). This relationship suggests that the recovered
286 dimension is not measuring differences between judges’ political attitudes, but rather
287 their views about the usefulness of dissent, with justices to the left of the recovered
288 dimension – Hale, Mustill, Morris and Hobhouse – more inclined to dissent than justices
289 such as Hope of Craighead, Browne-Wilkinson or Roskill. This is the only explanation
290 for why almost all of the discrimination parameters were positive – because judges who
291 are favourably inclined to dissent are, tautologically, often in the minority.
292 If the recovered dimension does indicate judges’ propensity to dissent, how can we
293 explain the moderate-to-strong relationship between their locations and the party that
294 appointed them? Previous US research has shown that female judges41 and judges from
295 non-traditional backgrounds42 are more likely to author dissenting opinions. Labour
296 nominated the only female Law Lord (Baroness Hale), as well as six of the eleven judges
297 who were not educated at fee-paying schools, despite nominating far fewer judges
298 (twenty-ﬁve to the Conservative party’s thirty-nine). Whilst attending a state school may
299 only be considered a ‘non-traditional’ background in the rariﬁed atmosphere of the
300 Lords, Labour appointees do differ in their background characteristics.
301 Conversely, the Conservative party nominated bare majorities of the Scottish (ﬁve to
302 four) and Northern Irish (two to one) judges shown in Figure 2; they are clustered
303 towards the right end of the recovered dimension. Of the nine judges who have practised
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Fig. 3. Ideal points and judges’ voting. (a) Ideal points by liberalism; (b) Ideal points by dissent
41 Monica Teets Farris, ‘Why Judges ‘‘respectfully dissent’’: An Analysis of Dissent on the US Courts
of Appeals’, Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, 2001.
42 Virginia A. Hettinger, Stefanie A. Lindquist and Wendy L. Martinek, ‘Comparing Attitudinal and
Strategic Accounts of Dissenting Behavior on the US Courts of Appeals’, American Journal of Political
Science, 48 (2004), 123–37.
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304at the Scottish bar or heard Scottish cases, only one – Jauncey of Tullichettle – is to the
305left of the median justice (Lord Rodger of Earlsferry, also Scottish). Indeed, we can be far
306more conﬁdent about differences between Scottish/non-Scottish judges than we can be
307about party differences: P½~yScot4 ~y:Scot ¼ 0:96.
308This ﬁnding suggests that propensity to dissent is based on particular personal
309characteristics, rather than the idiosyncrasies of individual judges, and that appointees
310of different parties differ in those personal characteristics. Judges who specialize in English
311law (rather than Scots law or the law of Northern Ireland) and who come from non-
312traditional backgrounds, such as state schools or countries other than England (thus
313including both Welsh judges and judges such as Cooke, Pearson, Hoffmann and Steyn), are
314less likely to act deferentially towards English law in general and precedent in particular.
315Judges who specialize in Scots or Northern Irish law, whether from non-traditional
316backgrounds or not, act with greater deference in all cases, the majority of which involve
317English law. These personal characteristics may translate into differences in jurisprudence –
318‘Scots judges have tended towards ay black-letter interpretative approach to the law’43 – but
319there is insufﬁcient evidence of this. Only if we had a coding of the style of judicial opinions in
320terms of narrow, conservative holdings or broad, liberal holdings – in a fashion analogous to
321that given in Table 1 for case outcomes – could we demonstrate this.
322DISCUSSION
323Thus far, I have shown that a particular model of decision making on the House of Lords
324Appellate Committee, where judges’ votes are expressions of their location along a single
325dimension, is a poorer model of voting than a simple null model, which predicts that each
326judge has the same probability of voting with the majority. Therefore, the judge locations
327plotted in Figure 2 should not be interpreted as positions in the political space.
328This conclusion does not mean that judges’ decisions do not ‘reﬂect’ their attitudes in
329some other way. First, it is possible that a majority decision of a panel of judges is affected
330by the attitudes of the judges who comprise it, even if the individual decisions of panel
331members are not.44 This might be the case if judges seek consensus. Judges decide in part
332based on the draft opinions of their colleagues,45 and will ‘acquiesce or give a dubitante
333opinion’ in order to preserve unanimity.46 Judges are also less likely to reverse colleagues
334with whom they will have to work in the near future.47 Such behaviour violates the
335assumption of conditional independence that is found both in attitudinal models of
336judging and in the item response framework. Methods that treat the majority outcome as
337the explanandum, such as linear discriminant analysis48 or ecological item response
338theory,49 may therefore yield intelligible judge and case locations.
43 Aidan ONeill, ‘Judging Democracy: The Devolutionary Settlement and the Scottish Constitution’,
Edinburgh Law Review, 8 (2004), p. 186.
44 Sunstein et al., Are Judges Political? (in particular, Table 2.1 and pp. 38–39).
45 Robin Jacob, ‘Intellectual Property’, in Blom-Cooper, Dickson and Drewry, The Judicial House of
Lords 1876–2009, pp. 716–17.
46 Alan Paterson, The Law Lords (London: Macmillan, 1982), p. 102, quoting Lord MacDermott.
47 Jordi Blanes i Vidal and Clare Leaver, ‘Using Group Transitions to Estimate the Effect of Social
Interactions on Judicial Decisions’, unpublished working paper, 2010.
48 Robertson, Judicial Discretion in the House of Lords.
49 Michael Malecki, ‘Judicial Behavior Behind Mask and Shield: Modeling the European Court of
Justice’, paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, 2009.
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339 Secondly, the fact that the attitudinal model has been shown not to work in the
340 Appellate Committee of the House of Lords does not necessarily mean that it will also fail
341 for the new UK Supreme Court. Institutional features of the new court make it more
342 conducive to dissent; more cases are heard by nine-judge panels, which were a rarity in the
343 Lords; more cases result in a single majority opinion; and more cases deal with human
344 rights claims.50 These innovations, respectively, increase the likelihood that a judge will
345 disagree with the majority, and decrease the likelihood that a judge who disagrees will be
346 able to ﬁnesse his or her disagreement by giving a doubtful concurrence. Consequently,
347 whilst we ought not describe the ‘Law Lords’ as political, we may wish to reserve
348 judgement on future members of the Supreme Court. We may ﬁnd that the UK Supreme
349 Court is at the same historical juncture as the US Supreme Court in the 1940s – on the
350 brink of a collapse in the norm of consensus.51
50 Note that this is an area in which some scholars do believe there are differences between judges. See
T.T. Arvind and Lindsay Stirton, ‘Judicial Decision-Making in the House of Lords: A Preliminary
Analysis’, paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Political Studies Association, London, 2011.
51 Thomas G. Walker, Lee Epstein and William J. Dixon, ‘On the Mysterious Demise of Consensual
Norms in the United States Supreme Court’, The Journal of Politics, 50 (1988), 361–89.
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